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Summary: This paper describes the U.S. financial system’s response to the 
destruction caused by Hurricane Katrina and examines how financial safety nets 
helped meet consumers’ needs in the aftermath of the storm. Overall, we find that 
consumers who hold deposit accounts at financial institutions are less vulnerable to 
financial disruptions than individuals who do not have either a checking or a savings 
account (the unbanked). The federal banking regulators’ and financial institutions’ 
responses to Hurricane Katrina, the financial vulnerability of unbanked families to 
this unexpected catastrophic event, and how the American Red Cross, FEMA, and the 
Gulf States’ relief efforts supplied financial assistance to Katrina’s victims are also 
addressed. Finally, we present several strategies that can be pursued to further 
safeguard the U.S. population and the financial community against extraordinary 
events.   1.  Introduction 
  On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina stormed through the Gulf Coast region, making 
its way across Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama; included in its path was the city of New 
Orleans.
1 The storm caused substantial devastation as levies were breached, submerging or 
washing away most homes, commercial businesses, communication networks, and other 
infrastructure in the lower lying sections of New Orleans and the nearby coastal region. As a 
consequence, 80 percent of New Orleans was flooded, and there was, at best, limited electricity 
and phone service across the region. Also in limited supply were necessities such as food, bottled 
water, and shelter. By late September, the Department of Homeland Security’s Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) had received requests for assistance from 1,356,539 
families who were forced to relocate.
2   
Much of the Gulf Coast’s financial sector, including locally based banks, credit unions, 
and thrifts (hereafter, collectively referred to as financial institutions) suffered structural damage, 
and in some cases, facilities were completely destroyed. As a result, many Gulf Coast residents 
not only lacked basic necessities but also were without access to their financial accounts and the 
payment services provided by financial institutions.  
  In addition, use of card payment applications, such as credit, debit, prepaid, and 
electronic benefit transfer
3 cards, that require electronic connections to the payment system for 
authorization and processing was impaired by the lack of electricity and damage to the physical 
mechanisms, for example, automated teller machines (ATMs), personal computers, and merchant 
point-of-sale readers, used to initiate electronic transactions. Together, the weakened 
                                                 
1 We recognize that Hurricane Katrina devastated many local communities besides New Orleans, including 
Biloxi, Mississippi; Gulfport, Louisiana; and the numerous smaller cities along the affected Gulf Coast 
region. In large part, references are made to New Orleans because of the substantial information available 
about Katrina’s impact on that city.      
2 “Storm and Crisis:  Katrina’s Diaspora,” New York Times, October 2, 2005. 
3 Originally, electronic benefit transfer (EBT) cards were designed as a means to distribute food stamp 
benefits, replacing paper food stamps with plastic cards. Today, efforts are underway to explore the use of 
EBT cards as a way to deliver additional types of benefits, including Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families, child care assistance, child support payments, and the Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) 
program.  communication systems and structural damage presented many residents with significant hurdles 
when attempting to conduct simple financial transactions such as accessing funds, cashing 
checks, making purchases, or paying bills using any of these channels or the electronic payment 
applications they facilitate. As a consequence, many people in the region had to rely heavily on 
cash as their primary means of exchange. 
Over the years, regulators and financial institutions have worked to establish and 
maintain back-up systems and contingency plans that have proven invaluable to ensuring the 
stability of the U.S. financial system, particularly regional financial markets, following an 
extraordinary event, such as the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and, more recently, 
Hurricane Katrina. Many of the lessons learned by the financial community as a result of the 
2001 terrorist attacks were incorporated into regulators’ and financial institutions’ process of 
updating and further strengthening contingency and disaster recovery plans.
4 They also led to 
revised guidance and examination procedures for business continuity planning.
5
These efforts by regulators meant that financial infrastructures and information 
technology systems were strengthened, extensive protocols were put into place, and back-up 
communications networks were built to safeguard against manmade and natural disasters. As a 
result, the U.S. financial system has extensive and well-communicated safeguards to help the 
financial industry and its regulators quickly restore financial services and liquidity to regions 
devastated by extraordinary events. The contingency and disaster recovery plans established by 
the Federal Reserve and regional financial institutions were activated during Hurricane Katrina. 
   This paper describes the U.S. financial system’s response to the destruction caused by 
Hurricane Katrina and examines how financial safety nets helped meet consumers’ needs in the 
                                                 
4 Federal Reserve Board, “Interagency Paper on Sound Practices to Strengthen the Resilience of the U.S. 
Financial System,” April 2003. The paper discusses recovery and resumption objectives for clearing and 
settlement activities in support of critical markets. 
(www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/2003/20030408/attachment.pdf) 
5 See the FFIEC’s booklet, Business Continuity Planning, May 2003. 
(www.ffiec.gov/ffiecinfobase/html_pages/bcp_book_frame.htm) 
  3aftermath of the storm. Overall, we find that consumers who hold deposit accounts at financial 
institutions are less vulnerable to financial disruptions than individuals who do not have either a 
checking or a savings account (the unbanked). Section 2 describes the response to Hurricane 
Katrina by federal banking regulators and financial institutions, and section 3 discusses unbanked 
families’ financial vulnerability to this catastrophic event. Section 4 outlines how the American 
Red Cross, FEMA, and the Gulf States’ relief agencies supplied financial assistance to Katrina’s 
victims. In section 5, we describe some of the unique challenges and potential benefits of using 
pre-funded payment cards by relief organizations and government agencies. The final section 
proposes strategies — a number of which were raised during our discussions with leaders in the 
financial services industry — that can be pursued to further safeguard the U.S. population and the 
financial community against extraordinary events.   
  
2.  Response by Financial Regulators and Institutions 
Federal bank, thrift, and credit union regulatory agencies
6 (the agencies) responded to the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina by taking immediate steps to ensure that the market had sufficient 
liquidity to meet consumers’ and businesses’ demands for cash in the absence of alternative 
electronic payment options. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (BOG), and 
particularly the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta,
7 activated contingency operations and 
procedures to provide currency and check services to the Gulf Coast region from alternative 
Federal Reserve locations.
8 To this end, the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta began armored car 
transports to the region as soon as the hurricane had passed, moved check clearing operations to 
Atlanta, and maintained the discount window to assist all depositories in meeting their liquidity 
                                                 
6 These agencies include the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (BOG); the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC); the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA); the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC); and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). 
7 As one of 12 Reserve Banks, the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta operates six facilities in the Sixth 
Federal Reserve District, including the New Orleans Branch office. 
8 A detailed description of the Atlanta Fed’s challenges and responses are provided in its Fourth Quarter 
2005 issue of Financial Update at  www.frbatlanta.org. 
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9 At the same time, the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) activated its 
disaster relief policy to improve market liquidity and provide credit relief for the region’s credit 
unions. Under this policy, “the NCUA will, where necessary, encourage credit unions to make 
loans with special terms and reduced documentation to affected members; reschedule routine 
examinations of affected credit unions, if necessary; guarantee lines of credit for credit unions 
through the National Credit Union State Insurance Fund; and make loans to meet the liquidity 
needs of member credit unions through the Central Liquidity Facility.”
10
  In addition, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the NCUA 
immediately began tracking and reporting on the operational status of financial institutions, 
monitoring the progress being made to bring these facilities back online. On September 12, 2005, 
the FDIC reported that it had been in contact with all 280 federally insured depository institutions 
in the Gulf Coast area and that 363 of a total of 5,054 branches were still out of service.
11 By 
October 18, 2005, the FDIC updated its information to show that the hurricane had affected 100 
financial institutions with offices in the region and 182 of these institutions’ branches remain 
closed, 50 percent less than reported as of September 12.
12    
Similarly, on September 7, the NCUA reported that the storm had affected 139 credit 
unions with a total of $3.4 billion in assets. Of these, 32 were nonoperational, representing less 
than 10 percent of the total assets. By September 16, the NCUA reported that all credit unions 
were operational and providing their members with access to their funds.
13  
  While many financial institutions’ locations were back in operation within days of the 
hurricane, there were also a significant number in hard hit areas that had been destroyed by the 
                                                 
9 Remarks by Governor Mark W. Olsen, at the Annual Economic Outlook Conference, Middle Tennessee 
State University, “Business Trends and Management Challenges for the Banking Industry,” September 16, 
2005. (www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/20050916/default.htm) 
10 NCUA, “NCUA Activates Disaster Assistance in Response to Hurricane Katrina,” news release, August 
29, 2005. 
11 William D. Jackson and Barbara L. Miles, Katrina’s Wake: Restoring Financial Services, Congressional 
Research Service Report for Congress, September 15, 2005. 
12 See the FDIC’s website: www.fdic.gov/news/katrina/index.html 
13 The NCUA noted that some credit unions may be operating out of back-up sites. 
(www.ncua.gov/news/press_releases/2005/NR05-0916.htm) 
  5storm or that, even after several weeks, remained inaccessible. As a result, these banks’ customers 
were forced to use alternative branch locations, completely different banks, or, perhaps, ATMs 
outside of their bank’s network in order to conduct critical financial transactions such as getting 
cash from their accounts and cashing government benefits, disaster relief, or payroll checks. In 
support of these efforts, the agencies encouraged depository institutions to relax rules about 
providing services to noncustomers and nonmembers. For example, on August 31, 2005, the 
NCUA issued guidance that noted that credit unions are able to provide emergency financial 
services, such as check cashing and access to ATM networks, to nonmembers under certain 
conditions.
14  
  In addition to encouraging financial institutions to provide services to noncustomers, the 
agencies also addressed ways to ease the financial strain on Gulf Coast residents. In conjunction 
with the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, the agencies released guidance on September 1, 
2005, that asked “insured depository institutions to consider all reasonable and prudent steps to 
assist (with) customers’ and credit union members’ cash and financial needs in areas affected by 
Hurricane Katrina.”
15 This communication listed a number of actions that were acceptable in 
providing financial relief for area residents, including: 
  Waiving ATM fees for customers and noncustomers 
  Increasing ATM daily cash withdrawal limits 
  Easing restrictions on cashing out-of-state and noncustomer checks 
  Waiving overdraft fees as a result of paycheck interruption 
  Waiving early withdrawal penalties on time deposits 
  Waiving availability restrictions on insurance checks 
  Allowing loan customers to defer or skip some payments 
  Waiving late fees for credit card and other loan balances because of interrupted mail 
service/delivery of billing statements or the customer’s inability to access funds 
                                                 
14 NCUA, “Taskforce, Toll-Free Number Established to Address Credit Union Operations and Members 
Affected by Hurricane Katrina,” press release, August 31, 2005. 
(www.ncua.gov/news/press_releases/2005/NR05-0831-2.htm) 
15 Federal Reserve Board, “Agencies Encourage Insured Depository Institutions to Assist Displaced 
Customers,” joint press release, September 1, 2005. 
  6  Easing credit card limits and credit terms for new loans 
  Delaying delinquency notices to credit bureaus 
On November 30, 2005, in a related FFIEC press release, these same agencies further 
encouraged depository institutions to continue working with borrowers affected by Hurricane 
Katrina, noting that “granting additional deferral periods for some borrowers in accordance with 
sound risk management practices may be appropriate given that the timing and amount of 
insurance payments, disaster payments, and other assistance may still be unknown.”
16   
As financial institutions began to service both their existing customers and noncustomers, 
it quickly became clear that verifying a consumer’s identity was often a significant hurdle. In the 
quick exodus from homes endangered by rising flood waters, many residents had lost or left 
without documents, such as a driver’s license, a Social Security card, and so forth, that are 
generally accepted by banks as proof of identification for the purposes of complying with the 
customer identification program (CIP) in the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA). In consultation with the 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) at the U.S. Treasury, the agencies encouraged 
depository institutions to make use of the flexibility in the act’s language. Specifically, the CIP 
allows for depository institutions to design a program that uses “documents, nondocumentary 
methods, or a combination to verify a customer’s identity.” Given the unusual circumstances in 
the post-hurricane Gulf Coast, the agencies suggested that depository institutions consider 
nondocumentary methods in certain situations and amend, as needed, its CIP.
17    
The agencies also noted that BSA regulations require financial institutions to obtain 
certain customer information prior to opening a new account: name, address, date of birth, and 
taxpayer identification number.
18 The regulations do not, however, require a financial institution 
                                                 
16 FFIEC, “Agencies Encourage Insured Depository Institutions to Continue Efforts to Meet the Financial 
Needs of Customers Recovering from the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,” press release, November 30, 
2005. 
17 Federal Reserve Board, “Agencies Encourage Insured Depository Institutions to Assist Displaced 
Customers,” joint press release, September 1, 2005. 
(www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/205/20050901/default.htm) 
18 For most people, the taxpayer identification number is their Social Security number. 
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following the account opening.
19 Therefore, banks were granted flexibility under the statute to 
define a “reasonable time,” given the post-hurricane circumstances. However, simply cashing 
noncustomers’ checks is not considered “opening an account,” and financial institutions had 
discretion regarding the extent to which they provided this service to noncustomers and which 
documents they would require. Moreover, financial institutions receiving wire transfers under 
$3,000 for noncustomers are not required by law to verify the recipient’s identity, although many 
choose to do so as part of their standard practices. Alternatively, for amounts greater than $3,000, 
the agencies noted that financial institutions should “obtain and retain the name of the 
beneficiary, address, type of identification document reviewed and number of identification 
document, and taxpayer identification number.”
20
  The federal regulatory agencies’ responses and the contingency and disaster recovery 
plans put in place by financial institutions were effective in many ways.
21 Cash was being moved 
to the affected areas, regulatory agencies were encouraging institutions to relax rules about 
servicing noncustomers, and many forms of financial relief were being provided to the region’s 
residents. Additionally, a large majority of financial institutions had successfully shifted data 
systems and clearing and settlement operations to alternative locations. As a result of these 
financial safety nets, Gulf Coast residents who had formal banking relationships were able to 
immediately benefit from the practices instituted by the agencies and financial institutions.   
Among those most affected by Katrina were individuals who fell outside the financial 
mainstream — the unbanked. Studies have consistently shown that the unbanked are most likely 
to have lower income, be a member of a minority group, and reside in a low- to moderate-income 
                                                 
19 Federal Reserve Board of Governors, “Statement on Supervisory Practices Regarding Financial 
Institutions and Borrowers Affected by Hurricane Katrina,” September 15, 2005. 
20 Each of these areas was addressed in guidance titled “FAQs for Financial Institutions on the Bank 
Secrecy Act and Hurricane Katrina Victims,” released by the agencies and FinCEN on September 9, 2005. 
21 Although this paper focuses on the actions taken by federal regulators, we acknowledge the importance 
of state banking regulatory agencies in promoting financial stability and regulatory compliance for state-
chartered financial institutions and other state-licensed providers. 
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22 An important question that arises is how unbanked families from the New 
Orleans inner city and the surrounding region were able to cope in the aftermath of Katrina. The 
financial circumstances and subsequent relief efforts provided to unbanked families is described 
in the next section. 
 
3. Financial Vulnerability of Unbanked Families 
Insights about the circumstances faced by families most vulnerable to the impact of 
Katrina are provided in a survey of evacuees in the Houston Astrodome shelter conducted by the 
Washington Post, Kaiser Family Foundation, and Harvard University (WKH).
23 Ninety-eight 
percent of those surveyed were from the greater New Orleans area. According to the survey, the 
majority of these evacuees were unbanked, had lower annual income, and were members of a 
minority group. Specifically, 74 percent reported a total before-tax income last year of less than 
$30,000.
24 Almost two-thirds of the respondents were unbanked, 95 percent were members of a 
minority group (of which 93 percent were black), and 72 percent did not own credit cards. A 
majority of these evacuees said they had remained in the hurricane region either because they 
                                                 
22 See Sherrie L.W. Rhine and William H. Greene, “The Determinants of Being Unbanked for U.S. 
Immigrants, ”Journal of Consumer Affairs, forthcoming, 2006; Jeanne Hogarth and Kevin H. O’Donnell, 
“Being Accountable: A Descriptive Study of Unbanked Households in the U.S.,” Proceedings of the 
Association for Financial Counseling and Planning Education, Phoenix, Arizona, 1997; Booz-Allen and 
Hamilton Shugoll Research, “Mandatory EFT Demographic Study,” OMB #1510-00-68, Washington: U.S. 
Department of the Treasury, September 15, 1997; and John P. Caskey,  Lower-Income Americans, Higher 
Cost Financial Services, University of Wisconsin-Madison, School of Business: Filene Research Institute, 
Center for Credit Union Research, 1997. 
23 The survey’s intent was to cover the population hardest hit by the hurricane: those who did not make it 
out of the city in time, those who had to rely on government help to evacuate, and those who did not have 
access to alternative shelter on their own.  This survey was conducted September 10-12, 2005.   
24 The latest income information available for this region is drawn from the 2004 American Community 
Survey, U.S. Census Bureau.  The median family income for the New Orleans area was $36,465.  To be 
categorized as low income, family income must be less than 50 percent of the median family income for the 
metropolitan area (threshold of $18,233).  Similarly, family income that is greater than 50 percent of the 
median family income for the area but less than 80 percent of the median family income for the area is 
defined as moderate income (threshold of $29,171).  
  9lacked a way to get out (that is, no means of transportation) or because no lodging or shelter was 
available elsewhere.
25   
  In the wake of Katrina, finding access to needed check cashing and other financial 
services for unbanked evacuees was not easily accomplished. Without deposit accounts, 
unbanked individuals could not benefit from direct deposit of payroll or other sources of income, 
electronic bill payment, or cash from ATMs. Unbanked individuals could not easily cash checks 
they already held or retrieve paychecks owed to them by their employers. Moreover, mail service 
disruptions made it impossible to deliver Social Security or supplemental security income, private 
pensions, and child support or alimony payments to recipients not using direct deposit. As 
displaced residents, these evacuees no longer had permanent addresses, likely causing future 
delays in receiving income checks.  
  It is fairly common for unbanked or lower-income persons to obtain check cashing and 
other financial services from alternative providers of financial services, e.g., check cashers, 
money transmitters, and payday lenders,
26 among others.
27 These companies, however, faced 
property losses and limited or complete lack of electricity and phone lines, the same as other 
businesses in the Gulf Coast region. As a consequence, unbanked evacuees’ ability to gain access 
to their funds was severely limited until after they had relocated. Even for the roughly 33 percent 
of lower-income “banked” evacuees described in the WKH study, any personal budget tightness, 
possibly coupled with no savings or line of credit to tap into, would have exacerbated their 
financial circumstances in the hurricane’s aftermath.   
                                                 
25 Washington Post/Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard University, Survey of Hurricane Katrina Evacuees, 
September 2005. (www.kff.org/newsmedia/upload/7401.pdf) 
26 The clients of payday lenders are almost always individuals with a deposit account, suggesting that it is 
liquidity-constrained banked consumers who patronize payday lenders. 
27 See Sherrie L.W. Rhine, William H. Greene, and Maude Toussaint-Comeau, “The Importance of Check-
Cashing Businesses to the Unbanked:  Racial/Ethnic Differences,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 
forthcoming, February 2006. 
 
  10  Although the safety net succeeded in bringing financial stability to the areas traumatized 
by Katrina, individuals without established relationships in the financial mainstream remained 
especially vulnerable. In Katrina’s wake, federal and state agencies and nonprofit organizations 
brought financial relief to those most affected by using an electronic means of funds 
disbursement: prepaid cards.
28 Prepaid cards are payment cards on which value has been pre-
loaded. The prepaid card can be used for retail purchases and bill payment at merchants and other 
service providers that accept the network brand on the card. Additionally, the cards can be used to 
withdraw funds from ATMs in participating networks. Because prepaid card transactions are 
processed similarly to those for conventional debit and credit cards, they require an electronic 
connection to the payment network to function.  
  The potential to use prepaid cards as a method for distributing relief funds is of particular 
interest to this study for several reasons. First, branded prepaid cards are widely accepted in the 
marketplace and are often a convenient way for unbanked individuals to carry out their financial 
transactions. Second, making electronic transfers is less costly (roughly, an average of $0.20 per 
transfer) than writing checks (an average between $1.00 and $2.00 per check), making prepaid 
cards a more cost-effective way of delivering relief.
29 Third, providing relief funds through 
prepaid cards can be safer than holding cash for recipients; can limit spending to pre-approved 
merchants, such as those selling food, clothing, or shelter; and can be less risky in terms of theft 
or fraud for the agencies and organizations distributing them. The next section describes the relief 
efforts undertaken by agencies and organizations for victims of Katrina. 
 
                                                 
28 In this paper, the term prepaid cards or branded prepaid cards (also called stored-value cards) refers to 
payment cards pre-loaded with value and branded with a payment network, such as Visa, MasterCard, 
American Express, and Discover, to allow for broad acceptance at locations accepting the network brand.  
29See Eric Miller, “Payroll Debit Cards,” proceedings from the conference on Stored Value: The Shape of 
Things to Come, Pelorus Group, October 2004. In addition to the costs of check printing, employers save 
by reducing or eliminating costs in distribution logistics, escheat compliance, replacement of lost or stolen 
checks, check fraud, error correction, and reconciliation for termination pay. 
  114. Relief Efforts 
The Gulf Coast states’ electronic benefits transfer (EBT) programs,
30 the American Red 
Cross (Red Cross), and FEMA played important roles in providing financial relief to residents 
affected by Hurricane Katrina. The Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) administers the nutrition 
assistance programs of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The cornerstone of the 
USDA’s nutrition assistance is the food stamp program.
31 This program is delivered through 
EBT, an electronic system that allows recipients to authorize transfers of their government 
benefits from a federal account to a retailer’s account to pay for products received.
32 Each state 
administers its EBT program to provide income assistance to families eligible for food stamps, 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), and other supplemental cash programs.   
These benefits are delivered to families through EBT cards that have been electronically loaded 
with the appropriate dollar value of benefits. Families make point-of-sale purchases for food and 
other necessities with EBT cards by electronically accessing the funds using a personal 
identification number (PIN).  
The states of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama used their existing EBT programs to 
help deliver food and cash assistance to residents of their respective states.
33 In Louisiana, for 
example, 300,000 EBT food stamp recipients obtained assistance through EBT. An additional 
280,000 households in the hurricane region also received food and cash assistance with EBT 
cards. The USDA allowed a 30-day allotment of food assistance using existing EBT programs. 
This time limit was imposed to minimize the potential for fraud. Approximately 977,000 
households were certified to receive EBT cards for disaster relief, and certification requirements 
were less stringent for disaster relief recipients. In particular, they were required only to show 
                                                 
30 For more information on the development of EBT programs and their migration from paper scrip to 
plastic cards, see “Assessing the Impact of Electronic Benefits Transfer on America’s Communities and the 
U.S. Payment System,” conference summary, Payment Cards Center, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia, September 2004. 
31 For more information, go to www.fns.usda.gov/fns/about.htm. 
32 Details about EBT can be found at www.fns.usda.gov/fsp/ebt/. 
33 ATM & Debit News, September 22, 2005. 
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necessary under the traditional food stamp program.   
Prepaid cards were one of the ways in which the Red Cross and FEMA provided 
financial relief to evacuees, although with different levels of success. In conjunction with JP 
MorganChase and MasterCard International, the Red Cross’s Katrina relief program distributed 
funds, totaling over $100 million as of September 14, 2005, to victims in several ways: by check, 
money order, direct deposit, and prepaid card. During this same period, the Red Cross distributed 
more than 300,000 prepaid cards, ranging in value from $360 to $1,565. Initially, the high 
demand for aid created distribution difficulties for the Red Cross.
34 By September 22, 2005, the 
organization was ordering an additional 100,000 prepaid cards daily to meet the demand for Red 
Cross aid.
35 Alternatively, FEMA’s prepaid card program was discontinued after only a few days. 
As of September 13, 2005, FEMA had distributed over $819 million in relief funds, of which 
only $20.6 million were distributed in the form of approximately 10,000 prepaid cards, valued at 
$2,000 each.
36  
The increased distribution of prepaid cards by government and relief organizations is an 
important example not only of the general trend toward electronic payments but also of a lower-
cost option than cutting and processing checks. Prepaid cards can be a particularly useful way to 
deliver financial assistance to lower-income and unbanked disaster victims. It also offers 
recipients a convenient and safe way to meet their financial needs.
37 Although this experience 
demonstrates that prepaid cards can be deployed for emergency relief, several hurdles must be 
overcome before greater efficiencies and larger benefits can be gained.  
 
                                                 
34 See Cardline, September 16, 2005. 
35 See ATM & Debit News, September 22, 2005. 
36 David Breitkopf, “In Brief: FEMA Discontinues Relief-Card Program,” American Banker, September 15, 
2005. 
37 How unbanked and low-income consumers use prepaid cards (often referred to as stored-value cards) to 
meet their financial obligations is further described in “Stored Value Cards as an Electronic Payment for 
Unbanked Consumers,” by Sherrie L.W. Rhine and Sabrina Su, www.newyorkfed.org/regional/commdev. 
  135. Delivering Relief via Prepaid Cards: Challenges and Benefits  
Structuring an effective emergency relief program using prepaid cards presents a variety 
of challenges to relief organizations and federal and state agencies. The first is establishing an 
applicant’s eligibility in an emergency. Disaster victims may not have documents available to 
substantiate their identities or addresses, making it difficult to validate an applicant as a qualified 
recipient of relief funds. The second is limiting application fraud by screening out ineligible 
applicants or disallowing eligible recipients to apply more than once, avoiding opportunities for 
double dipping. Third is restricting card use to pre-approved types of purchases, such as food, 
clothing, or shelter, and rejecting attempts to purchase nonapproved items. Fourth is determining 
whether the prepaid card relief program should allow funds to be reloaded to the cards or whether 
funds should be restricted to the preloaded amount, after which the card becomes defunct. While 
“reloadability” offers a long-term solution, adding convenience for disaster relief victims and 
greater distribution efficiencies, it will likely require stronger customer identification protocols in 
order to limit the potential for illicit use. In disaster areas where residents may not have access to 
identification documents, reloadable prepaid relief cards may not be a feasible option unless 
identification requirements can be managed, making limited-use cards more practical. Fifth is the 
ability to electronically connect to the payment networks for authorizing and settling transactions. 
Again, in disaster areas, relying on electronic payments may be difficult when the availability of 
electricity is spotty or there is damage to ATMs or merchants’ point-of-sale card readers. Each of 
these challenges requires the program’s organizers to balance the need to quickly and efficiently 
get relief funds to those in disaster areas with the ability to do so in ways that control for fraud 
and other misuse.
38  
  Despite these challenges, the potential benefits of a prepaid card relief program are many. 
Using these cards, organizations can quickly get financial relief into the hands of lower-income 
                                                 
38 For a brief discussion about some of the major advantages and shortcomings associated with using 
prepaid cards in disaster situations, see Jennifer Tescher, “Lessons from Katrina on Prepaid Cards,” 
American Banker, September 30, 2005. 
  14consumers who may not have checking or savings accounts. Electronic payment cards can be less 
costly and more easily transported and distributed than cash or checks by relief organizations and 
state agencies in disaster areas. In emergency situations, prepaid cards that are branded by a 
payment network are widely accepted at merchants such as grocery stores and hotels across the 
country. A prepaid card relief program can also help consumers carry out their immediate 
financial transactions without having to open a checking account until they are financially 
prepared to do so. 
At the same time, prepaid card issuers and marketers currently face uncertainties related 
to the unsettled regulatory environment for prepaid cards.
39 There are a number of prepaid card 
business models at varying stages of development and consumer acceptance in the market. As a 
result, regulators have been hesitant to apply uniform regulations to these different types of 
prepaid card applications because such an action might be costly and might inhibit continued 
innovation in this emerging payments area.
40 To the extent that regulatory uncertainty hinders 
continued innovation in this payments category, there is some concern that it may limit the 
development of prepaid card applications whose functionality is particularly useful in disaster 
areas and for underserved consumer segments. 
 
6. Strategies to Further Strengthen Financial Safeguards   
  The events following Katrina illuminated both strengths and weaknesses of current 
strategies to safeguard the U.S. population and financial system against natural and manmade 
disasters. The U.S. financial system has proven to be resilient in providing access to financial 
services and liquidity to many families and businesses affected by disasters. Even so, additional 
                                                 
39 For more details, see Mark Furletti, “Prepaid Card Markets and Regulation,” February 2004, pp. 13-18. 
See also, Julia S. Cheney “Payment Cards and the Unbanked: Prospects and Challenges,” July 2005, p. 13.  
40 See “A Summary of the Roundtable Discussion on Stored-Value Cards and Other Prepaid Products,” 
Federal Reserve Board. (www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/storedvalue/default.htm) 
  15steps can be taken by the public and financial community to make the recovery from catastrophic 
events smoother, more efficient, and less stressful for those affected.   
  A major obstacle faced by many Katrina evacuees was not having adequate 
documentation of identity or residence. To better prepare for the unexpected, households and 
business owners should make personal identification, residential information, and banking and 
other financial documents easily accessible in the event there is a need for quick evacuation. To 
minimize problems associated with gaining access to personal funds and to ease the burden of 
transactions, households and business owners can use electronic payments and fund transfers 
where it makes sense to do so, such as depositing funds directly into an account, making bill 
payments electronically, and using ATMs to get cash.  
  Financial educators and counselors can also play an important role in helping consumers 
understand the costs and benefits associated with the wide variety of financial products and 
services in the marketplace. In particular, the trend toward electronic payments suggests that 
consumers would benefit from having a clearer understanding of how electronic fund transfers 
and payments work, specifically how transactions involving direct deposit, ATM and debit cards, 
and pre-funded cards are carried out. Financial education is expected to benefit both unbanked 
and banked persons. As an example, roughly 32 million of the 77 million baby boomers do not 
use direct deposit for reasons such as do not trust direct deposit, desire to personally make 
deposits at the financial institution, and have a preference for paper checks.
41 These consumers 
are more likely to adopt direct deposit if they understand how it works and have greater clarity 
concerning its safety and ease of use over paper checks.    
                                                 
41 According to a study sponsored by the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Banks 
as part of their Go Direct campaign, 59 percent of Americans between 45 and 64 years of age use direct 
deposit.  By comparison, 65 percent of those 65 years of age and older use direct deposit for Social Security 
and other funds.   Because the study did not ask respondents whether they had a checking or a savings 
account, we are unable to determine what proportion of the 32 million persons are unbanked and 
subsequently do not use direct deposit.  See “Survey Reveals Baby Boomers Lag Seniors in Direct Deposit 
Usage,” Press Release, December 27, 2005, www.fms.treas.gov/news/press/go_direct_poll.html. 
  16  One of the important lessons learned from Katrina is that individuals who held deposit 
accounts at financial institutions were less vulnerable to financial disruptions than individuals 
who were unbanked. Financial educators and counselors can use the Katrina experience to 
explain the financial soundness of putting funds into a checking or savings account at a financial 
institution. This experience can also serve to show the advantage of having a financial cushion 
against unexpected events. For example, evacuees who had savings funds were financially better 
positioned than individuals who did not when events caused them to have to relocate, find 
housing, and get another job. In addition, financial educators and counselors can use this event to 
explain how having a sound credit rating can also help make funds available when disaster 
strikes.  
  In the course of researching the financial system’s response to Hurricane Katrina and the 
safety nets in place for disaster-area residents, we spoke to a number of leaders in the financial 
services industry who represented a cross-section of card issuers, payment processors, and 
payment consultants. These discussions helped us gain a better understanding of the practical 
issues faced by private-sector payment providers and brought to light several areas where further 
study may lead to more effective disaster recovery strategies for the financial services industry. 
We summarize several points here.  
  The CIP requirements under the Patriot Act become increasingly burdensome in disaster 
areas where, for a variety of reasons, affected residents do not have access to standard 
identification documents. This issue is exacerbated for lower-income consumers who may never 
have had traditional identification documents, such as a driver’s license, or formal banking 
relationships to fall back on to verify their identities. Peter Schnall of Capital One emphasized 
that the Katrina experience highlighted a need for improved ways to identify individuals and 
  17verify their identities in disaster situations for all consumers, especially those operating outside 
the formal banking system. 
42  
Another point raised by Schnall was that providing credit relief to disaster-area residents 
in the form of payment deferrals may have an unintended effect: Lenders may defer reporting 
delinquencies to credit reporting agencies, thereby complicating consumer credit risk analyses.
43 
Therefore, lenders may need to consider disaster-area residents’ payment performance differently 
in order to evaluate their repayment ability, for both existing customers and new loan prospects. 
A possible consequence of payment deferrals may be that lenders choose not to approve new or 
existing credit until they feel that this disaster-related effect has been appropriately captured in 
their lending models. Schnall suggested that lenders and researchers can use the Katrina 
experience to better understand the implications for consumer credit data and associated long-
term consequences related to measuring consumer credit risk in disaster-area lending markets.  
  Another area noted for further study is a better understanding of the benefits and risks 
associated with sharing data on evacuees, including updated contact information, with financial 
institutions. With better access to such information, lenders would be able to initiate contact with 
relocated customers — instead of waiting for their customers to contact them — in order to speed 
the cancellation of payment cards lost in the disaster and the delivery of replacement or reissued 
payment cards to disaster victims at their new addresses. In so doing, lenders are able to limit the 
potential for fraud related to either lost payment cards or undeliverable reissued cards. 
Government and relief agencies can also benefit from access to consolidated data on evacuees in 
order to facilitate uninterrupted distribution of relief, benefits, and entitlements.
44  
                                                 
42  Schnall is executive vice president and chief credit officer at Capital One. 
43 For more information, see the section, “Past Due and Nonaccrual Reporting” in Account and Regulatory 
Reporting Questions and Answers, Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council. 
(www.ffiec.gov/katrina.htm#credit) 
44 FEMA maintains a database of contact information for those disaster victims who have applied for 
federal assistance, but privacy concerns have limited sharing individual records with private-sector entities. 
  18  Frank D’Angelo of Metavante Corporation pointed out that one way to improve the 
financial safety net, particularly for the unbanked, lies in better coordination of disaster planning 
and relief fund distribution among federal and state governments, relief agencies such as FEMA 
and the Red Cross, and the financial industry.
45 Electronic payment innovations, such as prepaid 
cards, are emerging as a more efficient way to distribute relief funds to disaster-area residents, 
although government and relief agencies still face challenges in structuring these programs. As 
described in Section 5, these challenges can relate to recipient eligibility, purchase authorization, 
fraud, fund reloadability, and infrastructure concerns. D’Angelo suggested that addressing these 
challenges and making related decisions about program design and card functionality would 
benefit from improved dialogue among government agencies and relief organizations that provide 
financial relief to victims in disaster situations and those in the financial services industry who 
specialize in issuing cards and processing payments.  
  Along these same lines, Bob Bucceri, an industry consultant with Chaddsford Planning 
Associates, noted that electronic benefit transfer cards worked well as a mechanism to provide 
disaster relief to Katrina victims because card holders had experience with the program, e.g., EBT 
card holders; the card issuer or distributor had sufficient resources to provide on-site training to 
relief recipients; and the infrastructure was sufficiently intact to provide access points for card 
holders to initiate transactions.
46 He suggested that federal and state governments and relief 
agencies as well as financial institutions and regulators should evaluate whether their current 
resources could be harnessed to meet these same criteria when developing strategies to quickly 
get relief funds to victims of manmade or natural disasters. By doing so, organizations are better 
positioned to leverage tools already in place to deliver liquidity and payment capabilities to 
citizens in disaster areas. At the same time, Bucceri stressed that it is critically important to define 
                                                 
45 D’Angelo is president and chief operating officer of Metavante Corporation’s Payment Solutions Group. 
As described on its website, Metavante, a wholly owned subsidiary of Marshall & Illsley Corporation, 
delivers banking and payment technologies to financial services firms and businesses worldwide.  
46 Bucceri is also a chairman emeritus of the Electronic Funds Transfer Association’s EBT Industry 
Council. 
  19who is responsible for mobilizing these tools in an emergency, so that all aspects of a disaster-
response plan can be effectively coordinated.     
  T. Jack Williams of Tier Technology echoed both D’Angelo’s and Bucceri’s comments, 
adding that increased attention should also be paid to converting benefits disbursements such as 
unemployment, pension, and child support payments from traditional paper checks to an 
electronic format.
47 He also noted that the distribution process used to execute these 
disbursements would benefit from standardization of file formats, across various state programs, 
so that, in emergencies, the process is the same, regardless of which states’ residents are affected.  
 
7. Conclusion 
  When disasters strike, whether manmade or natural, the financial safety nets work well to 
stabilize the financial system. At the same time, we find that these safeguards are better able to 
provide liquidity and relief for consumers who are already part of the financial mainstream than 
for those who are unbanked and operating outside of formal banking relationships. Strategies for 
improving the financial safety net have been presented as ways to help minimize the financial 
disruptions for disaster victims. Several of these strategies hinge on better ways to identify 
customers, improved coordination between government and relief agencies and the financial 
services industry, and increased use of electronic payment applications as delivery mechanisms. 
At the same time, updating financial education curriculums to reflect lessons learned 
from Hurricane Katrina is an important step toward improving the public’s understanding of the 
U.S. financial system’s response to catastrophic events. Moreover, this education can help 
consumers make sound financial decisions, possibly encouraging more unbanked to join the 
financial mainstream and enjoy the benefits afforded by these safety nets. Hurricane Katrina 
demonstrated that the U.S. payment system’s transition from paper-based to electronic formats 
provides benefits beyond just convenience for consumers. The inherent flexibilities are also 
                                                 
47 Williams is a senior vice president with Tier Technology. 
  20critical factors in helping to build a more resilient financial services system that benefits all 
segments of our society. 
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